Martin Glazier

I am Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Scripps College, Claremont. Most of my work has been in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. I have further interests in logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of physics. I have a PhD in philosophy from NYU.

Book

Essence (2022). Cambridge University Press. Part of the Elements series. (abstract)

This short book gives an overview of contemporary work on essence and explores a new approach to the ancient debate over whether the essences of things lie inside or outside our everyday world.

Articles

The Contingency of Actuality (2025), Ergo 12(46): 1205–1225. (abstract)

According to orthodoxy, if something is actually true, then it is necessary that it is actually true. I argue that orthodoxy is mistaken and that things could have been actually different. This paper serves as a philosophical companion to "The Logic of Contingent Actuality".

Symmetries and Ground (2024), Philosophical Studies 181: 1087–1113. (abstract)

If the tiles of a mosaic are arranged symmetrically, then the image those tiles constitute must be symmetric as well. I formulate and defend the general principle at work in this case and show how it supports powerful objections to a range of reductionist views.

The Logic of Contingent Actuality (with Stephan Krämer) (2024), Ergo 11(8): 198–237. (abstract)

Most philosophers accept the principle "if actually p, then necessarily actually p", yet doubts about this principle go back to the very beginning of the formal study of the logic of actuality. We develop the logic that results if the principle is rejected. This paper serves as a formal companion to "The Contingency of Actuality".

The Unity of Science and the Mentaculus (2024), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75(2): 275–297. (abstract)

Can all of science be reduced to fundamental physics? And in particular, can the laws of the special sciences be reduced to the laws of fundamental physics? I examine whether the 'Mentaculus' of David Albert and Barry Loewer supports a positive answer.

Maybe Some Other Time (2023), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(1): 197–212. (abstract)

I develop a puzzle whose resolution requires us to recognize an unfamiliar distinction between two forms of metaphysical modality, each bearing a different relationship to time.

Is the Macro Grounded in the Micro? (2023), Philosophical Quarterly 73(1): 105-116. (abstract)

It's a popular view that everything about the ordinary macroscopic world can be explained in terms of microscopic objects like particles. I show that this view encounters great difficulty when subjected to even the most basic questioning.

A Substantial Problem for Priority Monism (2023), Ratio 36(4): 347-353. (abstract)

I raise an objection to priority monism, the view that the whole cosmos is the only substance there is. The objection is that although every substance is necessarily a substance, for the priority monist the cosmos is not necessarily a substance.

The Difference between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity (2021), Synthese 198(6): 1409–1424. (abstract)

Philosophers since Kripke have observed a contrast between those forms of necessity that are genuine, such as metaphysical and natural necessity, and those that are not, such as epistemic and deontic necessity. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I argue that the genuine forms of necessity are those that provide what I call 'necessitarian' explanation.

Being Someone Else (2020), in Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change, eds. Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler, 37-51. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (abstract)

Could I have been someone other than who I am? Philosophers from Williams to Nagel to Lewis have been tempted to answer 'yes', but how can we make sense of such a view? I argue that to say that it is contingent who I am is to say that it is contingent what perspective I have, in a distinctively metaphysical sense of perspective.

Explanation (2020), in the Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, ed. Mike Raven, 121–132. London: Routledge. (abstract)

I survey the philosophical literature on grounding explanation and its connection to metaphysical ground.

Essentialist Explanation (2017), Philosophical Studies 174: 2871–2889. (abstract)

Sometimes a thing is the way it is because it lies in its very nature to be that way. I show that this 'essentialist' form of explanation is a form of metaphysical explanation distinct from grounding explanation. Not only is essentialist explanation ubiquitous in philosophy, I argue, it is also an ultimate form of explanation.

Laws and the Completeness of the Fundamental (2016), in Reality Making, ed. Mark Jago, 11–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (abstract)

Many philosophers have thought that everything must admit of explanation in terms of the fundamental facts. I show how to formulate this thought precisely and argue that it requires the existence of fundamental metaphysical laws. I show that, pace Sider and others, such laws need not require the fundamental facts to involve anything nonfundamental.

Popular writing

Enterprise Blockchain Doesn’t Work Because It’s About the Real World (2021). CoinDesk.